waveapps-mcp stores Wave session cookies on disk and (optionally) your Wave password and TOTP secret. A vulnerability that exposes either could let an attacker act as you inside Wave. Please treat security bugs in this project seriously.

Do not open a public GitHub issue for security bugs.

Email luna@lunaparker.dev with:

• A description of the bug and what it lets an attacker do.
• Steps to reproduce, or proof-of-concept code.
• The affected version (npm ls waveapps-mcp or commit SHA).
• Your name / handle for credit (optional).

You can expect:

• An acknowledgement within 3 business days.
• A fix or mitigation plan within 14 days for high-severity issues (credential leak, RCE, auth bypass).
• A coordinated disclosure window before any public write-up.

• Bugs in Wave Accounting itself — please report those to Wave directly. This project only consumes Wave's API; it does not host or modify Wave's services.
• Issues that require an attacker to already have read access to your local user account (e.g. "if someone reads ~/.config/waveapps-mcp/credentials.json they can act as you" — yes, that's the documented trade-off; see the README).
• Bugs in third-party dependencies — please report those upstream. If a dependency-level CVE materially affects this project, we'll bump the version once a patched release is available.

• Credentials written to a world-readable path, or with weaker file permissions than 0600.
• Credentials leaking into logs, error messages, or transport over the wire to anywhere other than Wave's own domains (*.waveapps.com).
• Anywhere the MCP server can be tricked by tool arguments into making a request that wasn't intended (SSRF, prompt-injection-driven exfiltration, etc.).
• Authentication-refresh logic accepting forged session responses.
• Pre-commit / CI hook bypasses that would let real secrets land in the public repo.

Thanks for helping keep waveapps-mcp users safe.