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Crypto layer: Add missing input validation #10819

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3bae119
Crypto layer: Add missing input validation
lealem47 Jul 20, 2026
460d5d0
Increase WC_CMAC_TAG_MIN_SZ to SP800-38b recommendation
lealem47 Jul 20, 2026
4851d26
Remove MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ logic from kernel section to synchronize with …
lealem47 Jul 21, 2026
cd6b282
Fix spacing nit
lealem47 Jul 21, 2026
8a51b31
Testing touch-ups to account for error code fix and MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ u…
lealem47 Jul 21, 2026
dceb591
Limit WC_CMAC_TAG_MIN_SZ bump to FIPS builds
lealem47 Jul 26, 2026
a39ac0e
Address Skoll code review
lealem47 Jul 27, 2026
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6 changes: 3 additions & 3 deletions tests/api/test_aes.c
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -3381,8 +3381,8 @@ int test_wc_AesGcmEncryptDecrypt(void)
sizeof(iv)/sizeof(byte), resultT, sizeof(resultT) + 1, a, sizeof(a)),
WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(BAD_FUNC_ARG));
ExpectIntEQ(wc_AesGcmEncrypt(&aes, enc, vector, sizeof(vector), iv,
sizeof(iv)/sizeof(byte), resultT, sizeof(resultT) - 5, a, sizeof(a)),
WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(BAD_FUNC_ARG));
sizeof(iv)/sizeof(byte), resultT, WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ - 1, a,
sizeof(a)), WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(BAD_FUNC_ARG));

#if (defined(HAVE_FIPS) && defined(HAVE_FIPS_VERSION) && \
(HAVE_FIPS_VERSION == 2)) || defined(HAVE_SELFTEST) || \
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -4928,7 +4928,7 @@ int test_wc_GmacUpdate(void)
ExpectIntEQ(wc_GmacUpdate(NULL, iv3, sizeof(iv3), authIn3, sizeof(authIn3),
tagOut3, sizeof(tag3)), WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(BAD_FUNC_ARG));
ExpectIntEQ(wc_GmacUpdate(&gmac, iv3, sizeof(iv3), authIn3, sizeof(authIn3),
tagOut3, sizeof(tag3) - 5), WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(BAD_FUNC_ARG));
tagOut3, WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ - 1), WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(BAD_FUNC_ARG));
ExpectIntEQ(wc_GmacUpdate(&gmac, iv3, sizeof(iv3), authIn3, sizeof(authIn3),
tagOut3, sizeof(tag3) + 1), WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(BAD_FUNC_ARG));
wc_AesFree(&gmac.aes);
Expand Down
5 changes: 4 additions & 1 deletion wolfcrypt/src/dh.c
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -1138,7 +1138,7 @@ static int GeneratePrivateDh186(DhKey* key, WC_RNG* rng, byte* priv,
* WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK path to avoid unbounded heap allocation. */
if (*privSz > DH_MAX_SIZE) {
WOLFSSL_MSG("DH private key size exceeds DH_MAX_SIZE");
return BAD_FUNC_ARG;
return WC_KEY_SIZE_E;
}

qSz = (word32)mp_unsigned_bin_size(&key->q);
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1732,6 +1732,9 @@ int wc_DhCheckPubValue(const byte* prime, word32 primeSz, const byte* pub,
int ret = 0;
word32 i;

if (prime == NULL || pub == NULL)
return BAD_FUNC_ARG;

for (i = 0; i < pubSz && pub[i] == 0; i++) {
}
pubSz -= i;
Expand Down
22 changes: 15 additions & 7 deletions wolfcrypt/src/ecc.c
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -11414,16 +11414,24 @@ static int _ecc_import_x963_ex2(const byte* in, word32 inLen, ecc_key* key,
if (err == MP_OKAY) {
#ifdef HAVE_COMP_KEY
/* adjust inLen if compressed */
if (compressed)
inLen = inLen*2 + 1; /* used uncompressed len */
if (compressed) {
/* a compressed coordinate cannot exceed MAX_ECC_BYTES; bound it
* before doubling so inLen*2 + 1 cannot overflow word32. */
if (inLen > MAX_ECC_BYTES)
err = ECC_BAD_ARG_E;
else
inLen = inLen*2 + 1; /* used uncompressed len */
}
#endif

/* determine key size */
keysize = (int)(inLen>>1);
/* NOTE: FIPS v6.0.0 or greater, no restriction on imported keys, only
* on created keys or signatures */
err = wc_ecc_set_curve(key, keysize, curve_id);
key->type = ECC_PUBLICKEY;
if (err == MP_OKAY) {
keysize = (int)(inLen>>1);
/* NOTE: FIPS v6.0.0 or greater, no restriction on imported keys,
* only on created keys or signatures */
err = wc_ecc_set_curve(key, keysize, curve_id);
key->type = ECC_PUBLICKEY;
}
}

/* read data */
Expand Down
39 changes: 33 additions & 6 deletions wolfcrypt/src/kdf.c
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -89,6 +89,10 @@ int wc_PRF(byte* result, word32 resLen, const byte* secret,
Hmac hmac[1];
#endif

if ((result == NULL && resLen != 0) || (secret == NULL && secLen != 0) ||
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(seed == NULL && seedLen != 0))
return BAD_FUNC_ARG;

switch (hash_type) {
#ifndef NO_MD5
case md5_mac:
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -234,8 +238,18 @@ int wc_PRF_TLSv1(byte* digest, word32 digLen, const byte* secret,
WC_DECLARE_VAR(sha_result, byte, MAX_PRF_DIG, heap); /* digLen is real size */
WC_DECLARE_VAR(labelSeed, byte, MAX_PRF_LABSEED, heap);

if ((digest == NULL && digLen != 0) ||
(secret == NULL && secLen != 0) ||
(label == NULL && labLen != 0) ||
(seed == NULL && seedLen != 0)) {
return BAD_FUNC_ARG;
}

/* labLen + seedLen is checked with subtraction to avoid word32 wraparound
* (the labLen bound first ensures MAX_PRF_LABSEED - labLen cannot
* underflow). */
if (half > MAX_PRF_HALF ||
labLen + seedLen > MAX_PRF_LABSEED ||
labLen > MAX_PRF_LABSEED || seedLen > (MAX_PRF_LABSEED - labLen) ||
digLen > MAX_PRF_DIG)
{
return BUFFER_E;
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Expand All @@ -251,8 +265,10 @@ int wc_PRF_TLSv1(byte* digest, word32 digLen, const byte* secret,
sha_half = secret + half - secLen % 2;
md5_result = digest;

XMEMCPY(labelSeed, label, labLen);
XMEMCPY(labelSeed + labLen, seed, seedLen);
if (labLen != 0)
XMEMCPY(labelSeed, label, labLen);
if (seedLen != 0)
XMEMCPY(labelSeed + labLen, seed, seedLen);

if ((ret = wc_PRF(md5_result, digLen, md5_half, half, labelSeed,
labLen + seedLen, md5_mac, heap, devId)) == 0) {
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -286,6 +302,13 @@ int wc_PRF_TLS(byte* digest, word32 digLen, const byte* secret, word32 secLen,
{
int ret = 0;

if ((digest == NULL && digLen != 0) ||
(secret == NULL && secLen != 0) ||
(label == NULL && labLen != 0) ||
(seed == NULL && seedLen != 0)) {
return BAD_FUNC_ARG;
}

#ifdef WOLFSSL_DEBUG_TLS
WOLFSSL_MSG(" secret");
WOLFSSL_BUFFER(secret, secLen);
Expand All @@ -298,15 +321,19 @@ int wc_PRF_TLS(byte* digest, word32 digLen, const byte* secret, word32 secLen,
if (useAtLeastSha256) {
WC_DECLARE_VAR(labelSeed, byte, MAX_PRF_LABSEED, 0);

if (labLen + seedLen > MAX_PRF_LABSEED) {
/* Checked with subtraction to avoid word32 wraparound of
* labLen + seedLen. */
if (labLen > MAX_PRF_LABSEED || seedLen > (MAX_PRF_LABSEED - labLen)) {
return BUFFER_E;
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}

WC_ALLOC_VAR_EX(labelSeed, byte, MAX_PRF_LABSEED, heap,
DYNAMIC_TYPE_DIGEST, return MEMORY_E);

XMEMCPY(labelSeed, label, labLen);
XMEMCPY(labelSeed + labLen, seed, seedLen);
if (labLen != 0)
XMEMCPY(labelSeed, label, labLen);
if (seedLen != 0)
XMEMCPY(labelSeed + labLen, seed, seedLen);

/* If a cipher suite wants an algorithm better than sha256, it
* should use better. */
Expand Down
6 changes: 5 additions & 1 deletion wolfcrypt/src/rsa.c
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -1825,7 +1825,7 @@ static int RsaUnPad_OAEP(byte *pkcsBlock, unsigned int pkcsBlockLen,
if (ret != 0) {
ForceZero(tmp, hLen);
#ifdef WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK
XFREE(tmp, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_RSA_BUFFER);
XFREE(tmp, heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_RSA_BUFFER);
#elif defined(WOLFSSL_CHECK_MEM_ZERO)
wc_MemZero_Check(tmp, hLen);
#endif
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -5445,7 +5445,11 @@ int wc_MakeRsaKey(RsaKey* key, int size, long e, WC_RNG* rng)
goto out;
}

#if defined(HAVE_FIPS)
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if (e < WC_RSA_EXPONENT || (e & 1) == 0) {
#else
if (e < 3 || (e & 1) == 0) {
#endif
err = BAD_FUNC_ARG;
goto out;
}
Expand Down
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion wolfcrypt/test/test.c
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Expand Up @@ -31197,7 +31197,7 @@ static wc_test_ret_t dh_fips_generate_test(WC_RNG *rng)
#if defined(WOLFSSL_ASYNC_CRYPT)
ret = wc_AsyncWait(ret, &key->asyncDev, WC_ASYNC_FLAG_NONE);
#endif
if (ret != WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(BAD_FUNC_ARG))
if (ret != WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(WC_KEY_SIZE_E))
ERROR_OUT(WC_TEST_RET_ENC_EC(ret), exit_gen_test);
}
#endif /* !WOLFSSL_NO_DH186 && !HAVE_SELFTEST && !HAVE_FIPS */
Expand Down
21 changes: 14 additions & 7 deletions wolfssl/wolfcrypt/cmac.h
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -98,14 +98,21 @@ struct Cmac {




#ifndef NO_AES
#define WC_CMAC_TAG_MAX_SZ WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE
#define WC_CMAC_TAG_MIN_SZ (WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE/4)
#else
/* Reasonable defaults */

@Frauschi Frauschi Jul 27, 2026

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🟡 [Medium] WC_CMAC_TAG_MAX_SZ made user-overridable without bounding it to the 16-byte digest buffer
💡 SUGGEST api

The macro was previously hard-tied to the AES block size (#define WC_CMAC_TAG_MAX_SZ WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE) and could not be overridden. Wrapping it in #ifndef makes it a user-tunable knob, but the only consumer is the upper bound in wc_CmacFinalNoFree() (wolfcrypt/src/cmac.c:396), which is immediately followed by XMEMCPY(out, cmac->digest, *outSz) (wolfcrypt/src/cmac.c:452, :456) where cmac->digest is a fixed byte digest[WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE] (cmac.h:63). Any build defining WC_CMAC_TAG_MAX_SZ above 16 therefore turns a legal API call into an out-of-bounds read of the Cmac struct and leaks adjacent struct bytes (including k1/k2 subkey material) into the caller's output buffer. The header change alone creates the footgun; nothing in the tree enforces the upper bound.

Suggestion:

Suggested change
/* Reasonable defaults */
/* Reasonable defaults */
#ifndef WC_CMAC_TAG_MAX_SZ
#define WC_CMAC_TAG_MAX_SZ 16
#endif
#if !defined(NO_AES) && (WC_CMAC_TAG_MAX_SZ > WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
#error WC_CMAC_TAG_MAX_SZ cannot exceed WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE
#endif

#define WC_CMAC_TAG_MAX_SZ 16
#define WC_CMAC_TAG_MIN_SZ 4
#ifndef WC_CMAC_TAG_MAX_SZ
#define WC_CMAC_TAG_MAX_SZ 16
#endif

#if !defined(NO_AES) && (WC_CMAC_TAG_MAX_SZ > 16)
#error WC_CMAC_TAG_MAX_SZ cannot exceed WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE
#endif

/* SP800-38b recommends a minimum tag length of 64-bits */

@Frauschi Frauschi Jul 27, 2026

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🔵 [Low] WC_CMAC_TAG_MIN_SZ redefined without #undef in the FIPS >= 7 branch
💡 SUGGEST convention

The #elif !defined(WC_CMAC_TAG_MIN_SZ) arm newly advertises WC_CMAC_TAG_MIN_SZ as a user-overridable macro, but the FIPS >= 7.0.0 arm above it does a bare #define with no #undef. A FIPS v7 build that also passes -DWC_CMAC_TAG_MIN_SZ=4 (or sets it in user_settings.h) gets a macro redefinition with a different value - a diagnostic that becomes a hard error under the -Werror used in several CI configs. The settings.h changes in this same PR consistently use #undef before #define for exactly this reason.

Suggestion:

Suggested change
/* SP800-38b recommends a minimum tag length of 64-bits */
/* SP800-38b recommends a minimum tag length of 64-bits */
#if FIPS_VERSION3_GE(7,0,0)
#undef WC_CMAC_TAG_MIN_SZ
#define WC_CMAC_TAG_MIN_SZ 8
#elif !defined(WC_CMAC_TAG_MIN_SZ)
#define WC_CMAC_TAG_MIN_SZ 4
#endif

#if FIPS_VERSION3_GE(7,0,0)
#undef WC_CMAC_TAG_MIN_SZ
#define WC_CMAC_TAG_MIN_SZ 8
#elif !defined(WC_CMAC_TAG_MIN_SZ)
#define WC_CMAC_TAG_MIN_SZ 4
#endif

#if FIPS_VERSION3_GE(6,0,0)
Expand Down
56 changes: 26 additions & 30 deletions wolfssl/wolfcrypt/settings.h
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -3892,10 +3892,32 @@
#error WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ must be at least 1
#endif

#if defined(HAVE_FIPS) && FIPS_VERSION3_GE(7, 0, 0)
/* No short (<96 bit) tags per SP 800-38D 2026 revision in process. */
#if WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ < 12
#error WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ must be >= 12 per SP 800-38D Rev 1
#if defined(HAVE_FIPS)

@Frauschi Frauschi Jul 27, 2026

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🟠 [High] FIPS gate narrowed from <7.0.0 to ==5.2.4 raises min GCM tag to 12 for kernel FIPS 6.x, breaking RFC 4106 8-byte ICV
🚫 BLOCK bug

The block moved out of the WOLFSSL_LINUXKM section did not move verbatim: the FIPS condition changed from FIPS_VERSION3_LT(7, 0, 0) to FIPS_VERSION3_EQ(5, 2, 4). For a LINUXKM build with wolfCrypt FIPS v6.x (a supported kernel configuration - see linuxkm/module_hooks.c:115,639,1216 and linuxkm/linuxkm_wc_port.h:874 which all branch on FIPS_VERSION3_GE(6,0,0)), WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ goes from 8 to 12. The kernel glue still advertises and accepts an 8-byte ICV for RFC 4106: km_AesGcmSetAuthsize_Rfc4106() (linuxkm/lkcapi_aes_glue.c:1092-1100) returns 0 for authsize == 8, and rfc4106(gcm(aes)) registration is not FIPS-gated (linuxkm/lkcapi_aes_glue.c:162-168). The tfm therefore accepts setauthsize(8), but every subsequent wc_AesGcmEncrypt/wc_AesGcmDecrypt/*Final call fails with BAD_FUNC_ARG at wolfcrypt/src/aes.c:20086 and :20389. IPsec ESP with a 64-bit ICV silently stops working on FIPS v6 kernel modules. The module self-test (linuxkm_test_aesgcm_rfc4106) uses a 16-byte tag, so nothing catches this at load time. The commit message says only "Remove MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ logic from kernel section to synchronize with user-space build" - the version-predicate change is not mentioned and looks unintended.

Suggestion:

Suggested change
#if defined(HAVE_FIPS)
#if defined(HAVE_FIPS)
#if FIPS_VERSION3_LT(7, 0, 0)
/* support RFC 4106 IPsec ESP 64 bit tags */
#if WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ > 8
#undef WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ
#define WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ 8
#endif
#else
/* No short (<96 bit) tags per SP 800-38D 2026 revision in process. */
#if WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ < 12
#undef WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ
#define WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ 12
#endif
#endif

@Frauschi Frauschi Jul 27, 2026

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🟡 [Medium] FIPS 5.2.4 branch force-lowers WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ to 8 for user-space builds and overrides an explicit user setting
💡 SUGGEST api

Before this PR the whole adjustment block lived inside the #ifdef WOLFSSL_LINUXKM section, so a user-space FIPS build used the default (or user-supplied) WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ from line 3889 - normally 12. Now every FIPS 5.2.4 build, kernel or user-space, gets 8. Two consequences: (1) user-space FIPS 5.2.4 applications silently start accepting 64-bit GCM tags where they previously required 96-bit; (2) unlike the two sibling branches at 3914-3925, this one is an unconditional #undef/#define rather than a clamp, so a deliberate -DWOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ=16 is silently downgraded to 8 - a "minimum" macro behaving as a hard ceiling. Relaxing an authentication-tag minimum for every consumer of one FIPS version is a security-relevant default change that deserves to be explicit in the PR description.

Suggestion:

Suggested change
#if defined(HAVE_FIPS)
#if FIPS_VERSION3_EQ(5, 2, 4)
/* support RFC 4106 IPsec ESP 64 bit tags */
#if WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ > 8
#undef WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ
#define WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ 8
#endif
#else

#if FIPS_VERSION3_EQ(5, 2, 4) || (FIPS_VERSION3_LT(7, 0, 0) && \
defined(WOLFSSL_LINUXKM))
/* support RFC 4106 IPsec ESP 64 bit tags */
#undef WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ
#define WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ 8
#else
/* No short (<96 bit) tags per SP 800-38D 2026 revision in process. */
#if WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ < 12
#undef WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ
#define WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ 12
#endif
#endif
#elif defined(WOLFSSL_LINUXKM) && (defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS) \
|| defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SELFTESTS_FULL))
/* The Linux kernel native crypto fuzzer expects small AES-GCM tag
* sizes to succeed. */
#if WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ > 4
#undef WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ
#define WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ 4
#endif
#elif defined(WOLFSSL_LINUXKM)
/* support RFC 4106 IPsec ESP */
#if WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ > 8
#undef WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ
#define WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ 8
#endif
#endif

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -4371,32 +4393,6 @@
#undef HAVE_PUBLIC_FFDHE
#endif

#if defined(HAVE_FIPS)
#if FIPS_VERSION3_LT(7, 0, 0)
/* support RFC 4106 IPsec ESP 64 bit tags */
#undef WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ
#define WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ 8
#else
/* No short (<96 bit) tags per SP 800-38D 2026 revision in process. */
#if WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ < 12
#undef WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ
#define WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ 12
#endif
#endif
#elif defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS) || defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SELFTESTS_FULL)
/* The Linux kernel native crypto fuzzer expects small AES-GCM tag sizes to succeed. */
#if WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ > 4
#undef WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ
#define WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ 4
#endif
#else
/* support RFC 4106 IPsec ESP */
#if WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ > 8
#undef WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ
#define WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ 8
#endif
#endif

#if defined(LINUXKM_LKCAPI_REGISTER) && !defined(WOLFSSL_ASN_INT_LEAD_0_ANY)
/* kernel 5.10 crypto manager tests key(s) that fail unless leading
* zero bytes are tolerated in GetASN_Integer().
Expand Down
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